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Animal Rescue as Civil Disobedience
Tony Milligan1
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract Apparently illegal cases of animal rescue can be either open or covert:
‘open rescue’ is associated with organizations such as Animal Liberation Victoria
and Animal Liberation New South Wales; ‘covert rescue’ is associated with the
Animal Liberation Front. While the former seems to qualify non-controversially as
civil disobedience I argue that (irrespective of other considerations such as effec-
tiveness or advisability) at least some instances of the latter could also qualify as
civil disobedience just so long as various norms of civility (e.g. norms concerning
recognition of others, the avoidance of violence and threats) are satisfied. The case
for such a move is defended against objections that covertness is (1) inherently
suspect; (2) a failure to accept responsibility; and (3) inconsistent with civil dis-
obedience as a form of communication. Against such objections, the paper
emphasizes the importance of respecting the open texture of the concept of civil
disobedience if it is to be of continuing relevance against the backdrop of changing
forms of non-violent dissent.
Keywords Civil disobedience  Violence  Communication  Rawls  Covert
rescue  Open rescue
Animal Rescue
I want to argue that covert acts of animal rescue may (under some circumstances)
qualify as instances of civil disobedience. This is not necessarily a justification of
these actions or of their strategic wisdom as part of any broader approach towards
securing animal rights. It is, however, a defence of the view that even if unjustified
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the acts in question still have a special standing. I will also take it that (irrespective
of whatever else we want to say about the concept of civil disobedience) a claim of
special standing is what is brought into play when we refer to ‘civil disobedience’
by contrast with ‘direct action’ or by contrast with various forms of political
violence. (A point explained in more detail below.) By ‘animal rescue’ I have in
mind actions which involve the following:
(1) Removal of one or more animals from a situation of harm that has been
deliberately brought about by humans.
(2) Removal for the sake of the animal itself. (Although perhaps not only for the
sake of the animal.)
(3) Illegality, or at least the appearance of illegality in the form of trespass,
breaking and entering, and theft. (With the animals in question being regarded
as someone else’s property.)
The third clause focuses attention upon the appearance of illegality in order to
mark a contrast with the licensed (and legal) rescue operations of special animal
welfare bodies such as the RSPCA. This paper focuses instead upon actions
performed by animal rights activists when acting specifically as animal rights
activists. Whether or not the actions in question turn out to be illegal on some best
account of what the law is can be a matter for debate, although there is perhaps a
default presupposition of their illegality.
The two dominant forms of animal rescue, in this militant and challenging sense,
are covert rescue (with identity concealment) and open rescue (with identity
disclosure on the part of at least some of those involved). Covert rescue, in its
systematically organized form, has been practised since at least the 1970s and is
strongly associated with the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).1 Sporadic instances of
open rescue also date back to (at least) the later 1970s, but in its systematic and
regular form this kind of rescue dates only to the 1990s. Specifically, it dates back to
a sustained campaign of animal rescue initiated in 1993 and spearheaded by various
Australian animal rights organizations, the best known of which is Animal
Liberation Victoria (ALV).2 Open rescue is still practised in Australia and it is also
practised by animal rights groups in Europe and in the US but more sporadically and
with far less media coverage.3
Open rescue is quasi-respectable, and has been linked (by activists) with
Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha which, for simplicity, we may understand as the
non-violent struggle for justice and truth.4 (An implication of this is that satyagraha
for a bad cause would not be possible.) Covert rescue has a less favourable image. It
has been associated (at least in the US) with domestic terrorism and attempts have
been made to cluster legal responses to covert rescue together with responses to
1 Newkirk (2000), Mann (2009).
2 Mark (2003), Hawthorn (2010), O’Sullivan (2011), pp. 92–93.
3 Milligan (2013), chapter 11.
4 For civil disobedience as a branch of satyagraha see Gandhi (1996, pp. 50–57). For the association
between satyagraha and related forms of eco-activism see Naess (1974). For the association with open
animal rescue, see Milligan (2017).
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Islamic extremism.5 While this may make the distinction between open and covert
appear to be a rigid dichotomy, it nonetheless holds only up to a point. An open
rescue on the ALV model will typically involve some covert information gathering
prior to the (similarly covert) removal of a relatively small number of easily
portable animals such as laying hens. Removal is also, ordinarily, carried out at
night in order to avoid the risk of discovery and confrontation. The media and/or
police will then be informed and no attempt will be made to conceal the identity of
key activists. However, safety masks are sometimes worn (e.g. in laying sheds) and
this does give opportunities for some identity concealment by some participants. We
may, as a result, suspect that the authorities are given the identities of only a sample
of activists and not everyone. There are also issues of concealment with regard to
the broader networks of sympathizers who help to relocate and provide homes for
rescued animals. Even so, open rescue does involve a strong element of genuine
openness that covert rescue lacks. We might also struggle to associate the latter with
Gandhian satyagraha, although this on its own need not rule out a classification of
such action as civil disobedience given the demanding nature of Gandhian dissent.
Indeed, there may be good reason for keeping the concepts of civil disobedience and
satyagraha distinct in order to avoid a charge of excessive demandingness.
Covert Action and the Animal Liberation Front
At this point it may be worthwhile to focus upon one of the main reasons why it
seems counter-intuitive to regard covert rescue as civil disobedience, i.e.
organizational image, the way in which covert rescue has been deliberately
presented by the network of agents who issue publicity under the ALF banner,
publicity that is reminiscent of underground and quasi-terrorist organizations. To
some extent, the ALF was the victim of bad timing. It emerged in the UK in the
summer of 1976 at precisely the moment when growth of an organized
revolutionary left (Trostkyists, Maoists, fragmentary groupings spun off from the
declining communist parties of Western Europe) that had been significant around
the time of the Vietnam War and the events of May 1968 in France, was going
rapidly and permanently into reverse. Between 1975 and 1978 (give or take a few
months), it seems to have become clear to many political activists that these
groupings were not going to coalesce into mass organizations but would remain on
the fringes of politics.6 Nonetheless, in the far broader left-wing political circles out
of which the ALF grew, at first in Britain and then in America, a continuing
aspiration for radical political change beyond anything conceived of by social
democratic organizations, was combined with a lack of organizational impact. What
5 The Animal Enterprises Terrorism Act (2006) defines animal removal (i.e. rescue) as property damage,
and contains the provision that terrorism includes ‘Intentionally damaging or causing the loss of any real
or personal property (including animals or records) used by an animal enterprise, or any real or personal
property of a person or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal
enterprise’. For an assessment of the problems of this approach, see Hadley (2009).
6 For an unusually candid insider’s view of the onset of crisis among the Trotskyist groupings in the mid-
to-late 1970s see Harman (1979).
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helped to bridge the gap between aspirations and imagined political realities was a
widespread idealization of a range of genuinely terrorist organizations such as the
IRA, the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Red Brigades
and the Baader–Meinhof Group. The legacy of this has, in more recent times,
become extremely problematic for social democratic parties such as the Labour
Party in England (the left wing of which has repeatedly been accused of anti-
Semitism). When the ALF was formed, left sympathies for paramilitary organiza-
tions were at their height.
The upshot is that while the ALF has always been formally opposed to violence,
or at least opposed to violence against persons, it did initially model its public image
upon terrorist groupings and, more specifically, paramilitaries. Balaclavas and
combat fatigues, more familiar from artwork in West Belfast, have always figured
prominently in ALF publicity photos. Rescued animals are held across the chest like
assault rifles. And while this may have been a persuasive political image on the
radicalized left in 1976, it is far less so for our own times. The ALF has, however,
remained stuck with an image that was already out of step with political realities by
the 1980s and that has become utterly untenable in the aftermath of the attacks of
9/11. Paradoxically, one reason why it has been so difficult for the ALF to change its
mode of presentation is that it is not actually a centralistic terrorist organization. It
does not operate under a violently enforced military discipline. More simply, and
unlike bodies such as the IRA, nobody can give an authoritative order to change
tack. The absence of a centralized command structure means that disputes about
image and overall direction tend to rumble on without end.7 Given this, it is readily
understandable why the open rescuers of the 1990s in Australia should have thought
of open rescue as both radically different from the politically compromised
activities of the ALF and as an alternative to the latter.
Even so, in addition to the absence of a critical mass of support for an extensive
open rescue movement, there are at least two significant reasons why some animal
rights activists continue to find covert rescue an attractive option, or at least a more
attractive option than open rescue. Firstly, the open rescue model is largely
inapplicable in the case of laboratory animals whose special predicament has always
formed a lure for animal rights activists.8 The animals rescued in an open manner by
ALV (and by other open-rescue operations such as Animal Liberation New South
Wales) are typically deemed by their owners to have a low monetary value.
Subsequent identification of rescued animals is also difficult. To the undiscerning
eye of those who encounter thousands of birds every day, one low-priced chicken
may look much like another. The upshot is that the recovery of animals is generally
not attempted. Owners may want compensation or (an option we need not discount)
7 Perhaps the most prominent, and disastrous, example of a rare ‘turn’ by consensus was the alignment of
the ALF with the Earth Liberation Front which sought, at the end of the 1990s to secure political change
by economic attrition in the form of arson. Newkirk (2000, p. 336) has, with some plausibility, called this
approach ‘political suicide’.
8 Marcus (2005) has questioned the strategic priority of focusing upon experimentation, but it does
involve distinctive harms that can sometimes be absent from the food chain, Milligan (2010,
pp. 126–132). Accordingly, there is at least one good ethical reason for according it a high level of
attention.
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something close to payback or revenge. Or they may, more ambiguously, want
something to be done. But they are not usually interested in the actual return of the
rescued animals. By contrast, when lab animals are rescued from research facilities,
they can represent several months of work and in the case of primates they may be
expensive to acquire and difficult to replace. Individual lab animals are also,
typically, tattooed for identification and this facilitates subsequent recovery. Even
where efforts are made by rescuers to conceal tattooing, the presence of scarring and
of any unusual injuries that have been inflicted upon an animal can also facilitate
identification. From the rescuer’s point of view, recovery can be a real concern.
Sympathetic vets may have to be used by those who wish to prevent it from taking
place. Because of this concern about recovery, covertness has a practical rationale
that has nothing to do with the image and ethos of underground organization.
Rethinking Civil Disobedience
If we assume that civil disobedience is, by definition, action in defence of humans,
then the differences between open and covert rescue will be beside the point.
Neither will qualify. The reasons for making such a restrictive assumption are,
however, bound up with the idea that civil disobedience is best understood in
relation to something akin to contract theory. If our understanding of political
arrangements is that something akin to a social contract exists among humans and
that when the terms of the contract are violated a form of dissent that respects the
regular relations between free and equal agents may be legitimate, we may be
tempted to use this as the core of a theory of civil disobedience. Protest over matters
that fall outside of contractual bonds between humans could still be reasonable, on
such an approach, but they could not then count as civil disobedience. This is the
kind of thinking that has long been associated with John Rawls although exactly
how deeply it is embedded in his position is a matter of dispute. Rawls seems to
exclude protest over non-human matters but he may be read more generously.9
Either way, the restriction has generally been rejected and I will take it that rejection
is the best option. Certainly so, if we want to allow for at least some forms of eco-
protest to count as civil disobedience. And if we allow the latter, there is no good
reason to deny that civil disobedience over animals is just as possible.
If we want to identify some core feature of claims about civil disobedience, and
to root it more firmly in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr, then we
may do better to focus upon the idea of protest that has special standing. A more
technical way of putting the same point would be to talk about the normativity of the
concept of civil disobedience (various ‘oughts’ go with such talk). We may make
sense of its normativity by pointing out that it is plausible to say that civil
disobedience ought to have special legal standing (indeed some judicial figures be-
lieve that it already does, albeit at the level of background principles rather than
explicit rules for sentencing) or that it has special moral standing (and hence it is
9 Rowlands (1997, pp. 131–141), provides the classic defence of the applicability of Rawls to protest
concerning non-humans. For an appraisal of Rowlands, see Garner (2013, pp. 32–38).
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due a certain kind of tolerant response), but the same is not true with regard to
instances of direct action. The concept of direct action is normatively neutral.10
This idea of special standing can also be captured without appeal to problematic
aspects of the familiar Rawlsian conceptual machinery associated with the account
of civil disobedience in successive editions of A Theory of Justice. In particular,
those aspects of the Rawlsian approach that would automatically rule out covert
animal rescue as civil disobedience because such rescue does not look like a form of
communication. The key notion that the influential Rawlsian account of civil
disobedience is based upon is the idea of the illegally but peacefully communicated
message: where legal protest over the relations between humans is not listened to, a
way to make a point may need to be found beyond the bounds of the law. On such
an account, the making of a point (in a particular way) is what really matters.11
The Rawlsian approach to these considerations is cited so often that it is easy to
overlook its innovative nature and the fact that it has an awkward match-up with
anything that we are likely to find in the writings of Tolstoy, Gandhi or Martin
Luther King Jr. But what if the idea of civil disobedience as protest with a special
standing were cashed out otherwise? For example, by appeal to a notion of civility.
Such an approach could also claim a strong (perhaps stronger) precedent in
Gandhi’s writings and it need not automatically exclude all instances of covert
animal rescue or (similarly) covert eco-protest. On the strongest version of Gandhi’s
account of civil disobedience, agents who engage in the latter are required to act out
of a virtue of civility.12 More strictly, there is a doubling of Gandhi’s discourse in
which he refers to protest as an act of love while at the same time (and less
demandingly) referring to it as action out of civility.13
Here, I will suggest (as Gandhi does seem to have recognized on other occasions)
that while civility is less demanding than love, the requirement for an actual virtue
of civility remains too strong if the relevant kind of action is to be available to
ordinary flawed agents, to people like us, who have no special claim upon saintliness
or exemplary virtue.14 If we hold otherwise we will face two difficulties: (1) the
problem of defending the account of civility against a charge of elitism (a perennial
problem for civility theory); and (2) the problem that an action which would
otherwise be accepted as civil disobedience might not have this standing because of
the character of the agents involved, as exhibited on other occasions. Rather than
introduce a requirement that civilly disobedient action must express some
underlying state of virtue, we can adopt Gandhi’s less-demanding requirement that
it must be in conformity with various minimal civil norms. What we will then have
is an account of civil disobedience that is underpinned by a minimalist account of
civility that escapes from the elitism problem and the agent-character problem. Yet,
10 For an example of judicial recognition of the special standing of civil disobedience see Thornton et al.
(2010, pp. 333–334).
11 Rawls (1971).
12 For the importance of the civility of civil disobedience see Gandhi (2007, p. 319; pp. 318–319) and
Gandhi (1996, pp. 47–49, pp. 70–71).
13 Milligan (2014, pp. 291–295).
14 Milligan (2013, pp. 89–92).
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at long as the norms in question are sufficiently robust we need not have undermined
the rationale for claiming that special standing still applies.
But it is one thing to suggest that such a minimalist account can be set up as a
rival to a communication-based account, and quite another to actually set it out and
to do so in a plausible manner. The latter task is somewhat too large a project for a
single article. However, the outlines of such a civility-focused account can readily
be given. Political action in line with the following norms will go some way towards
capturing the relevant idea of ‘special standing’ protest.
(1) Respect for others or, if we have no fondness for the language of respect, the
recognition that other humans are fellow humans i.e. members of the same
moral community.
(2) The rejection of hate-speech. (Where communication is involved it too must
be civil.)
(3) The avoidance of acts that are driven by hatred. (A more minimal
commitment than the King/Gandhi/Tolstoy requirement that we love our
enemies.)
(4) The largely successful commitment to try to avoid violence and threats of
violence.
(5) The avoidance of cruelty, which has a special place in liberal discourse and a
special connection to the idea of humanity. Acts will lose their special
standing if they are cruel.
(6) The recognition of a duty of care or an avoidance of the reckless
endangerment of others. (Although recklessness and its avoidance may turn
out to be a matter of degree.)
There will, no doubt, be certain actions that superficially look like civil
disobedience but fail to comply with the above minimal norms. Neo-Nazis
blockading a synagogue as a celebration of the Holocaust, while singing ‘We Shall
Overcome’, would not be engaging in civil disobedience for a plausible and non-
arbitrary reason. While they might be non-violent and polite, theirs would be a false
civility because their action would be inconsistent with (1) above. They would not
be complying with a basic level of acceptance of all others (Jews included) as
members of the same moral community. However, some instances of reactionary
protest (however defined) might well qualify as civil disobedience. (Lawbreaking
protest in support of hunting might qualify just so long as the protest does not itself
take the form of hunting and the violence that it involves.) Gandhi would not have
liked this inclusion of reactionary instances of civil disobedience, given that he saw
civil disobedience as a branch of satyagraha, condisdered as the force of truth, but it
is difficult to see how a civility-based account can be norm-based rather than virtue-
based while avoiding this concession. Virtue requires a depth of insight that a basic
level of civility does not. Moreover, from an activist standpoint, this inclusiveness
has an obvious advantage: if various ‘reactionary’ instances of dissent are allowed
to qualify then it may be harder for courts to deny the civilly disobedient standing of
instances of dissent such as animal rescue (of whatever sort) on the basis that the
cause in question is not just.
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A different sort of worry is that the proposed account will be too permissive or
too inclusive. That it may not, in spite of being constraining up to a point, be
sufficiently constraining. Against this, it may be pointed out that it will allow for the
most plausible exclusions to be made even in cases where there seems to be some
sort of good cause. For example, while non-violent but disruptive eco-actions might
qualify, many other eco-actions will not do so.15 Covertly putting spikes into trees
as a way to disrupt felling might not itself be violent but it would involve reckless
endangerment and so would conflict with (6) above. However, what is noticeable in
the present context is that this failure to qualify has nothing to do with the
covertness of such ‘tree spiking’. Other eco-actions, such as shifting boundary
markers on sites scheduled for destruction, might well qualify while remaining
equally covert. Similarly, there are instances of covert animal rescue that will fail to
qualify for some or other reason. The scrawling of threats of violence upon lab walls
by animal rescuers, would fail to do so and might undermine any claim of civil
disobedience for the associated rescue. Even if civil disobedience does not need to
be thought of primarily as a form of communication, when communication is
involved it cannot take the form of threats while at the same time retaining a
plausible claim to be civil. For this reason, it seems clear that many and perhaps
most (and possibly all) actual instances of actual covert rescue by the ALF do not
qualify, but this is not simply because of their covertness but because of their failure
to comply with norms of civility.
There may also be other kinds of animal rescue which would, hypothetically, fail
to qualify irrespective of whether the rescue of animals was open or covert. For
example, the rescuing of animals from any laboratory engaged in work with an
exceptionally dangerous virus could well involve reckless endangerment (although
such a situation has not, as yet, been confirmed). And any form of animal rescue
that endangered the lives of the animals themselves would also fail to qualify.
The key point here is that while plausible exclusions may be made, and
imitations of civil disobedience may be ruled out, nothing in the above cluster of
basic civil norms will automatically exclude all possible instances of covert animal
rescue. And so, while covert rescue may lack the political potential of open rescue it
could also, in some instances, count as civil disobedience depending upon the
manner in which it is carried out. Or rather, it may do so just as long as a shift is
made from a communication-based account of civil disobedience to a more civility-
focused account of the above sort.
Reasons Why Civil Disobedience is not Supposed to be Covert
Given that there is a special rationale for covert rescue, particularly where lab
animals are concerned, open and covert rescue (or at least some radically modified
version of the latter) may begin to look like complementary activities. And, to some
extent, this is not an entirely misleading impression. However, beyond both being
instances of rescue, they still do not look like the same sorts of activities. While
15 Martin (1990, pp. 291–310).
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there is no obvious and good barrier to regarding open rescue as civil disobedience,
it may still seem intuitively obvious that covert rescue simply cannot qualify,
irrespective of how it is carried out. Its sheer covertness may seem to be an
insurmountable obstacle. And one reason for this is that civil disobedience has
typically been regarded (at least in the literature of the past couple of decades) as
public and, even more strongly, necessarily public. Again, the Rawlsian account has
set the tone for a good deal of writing on this theme. For Rawls, ‘civil disobedience
is a public act. Not only is it addressed to public principles, it is done in public. It is
engaged in openly with fair notice’; similarly, it is ‘a public, conscientious yet
political act contrary to law’.16 But exactly why this must be the case is not
altogether clear. The Civil Rights Movement and successive campaigns for Indian
independence were public but they were also religiously inspired and guided by a
sense of spiritual values. Yet we do not consider the latter to be essential to civil
disobedience. (Although Gandhi’s commitment to regarding civil disobedience as a
branch of satyagraha seems at times to entail precisely this.) Moreover, none of the
more obvious reasons for insisting upon the restriction to public acts look
simultaneously strong and sufficiently fine-grained to exclude covert rescue without
also excluding non-controversial instances of civil disobedience. The reasons for
exclusion, if they prove anything, seem to prove too much. Let us consider the more
obvious reasons in turn.
(1) Reason-1 Civil disobedience cannot take the form of action which is
intrinsically suspect, and there is always something intrinsically suspect about
covertness.
The idea that covertness is automatically suspect has quite a pedigree. It goes
back at least as far as Pericles and his account of why the Athenian state preferred to
operate out in the open. Understood as a requirement for civil disobedience, it can
be found in both Gandhi’s writings and in Hugo Bedau’s account of civil
disobedience, written at the time of the Civil Rights Movement, in the early 1960s.
For Gandhi, ‘Disobedience to be civil has to be open and non-violent’.17 (Although,
here again, what is doing the real work may seem to be a notion of civility with the
idea of openness regarded as a subordinate feature of the latter.) For Bedau, ‘Any
one commits an act of civil disobedience if and only if he acts illegally, publicly,
non-violently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws,
policies, or decisions of his government’.18 But while there is something attractive
about this option it does, nonetheless, seem to rest upon an over-generalization.
Covertness, at least in the form of identity concealment, can be sinister but it need
not be so. There is, for example, nothing particularly suspect about the actions of the
street artist Banksy, yet he acts in a covert manner, with his identity (until recently)
concealed, partly as a rejection of celebrity culture.19 A comparable point may be
16 Rawls (1971, p. 364).
17 Gandhi (2007, p. 319).
18 Bedau (1961, p. 661).
19 Banksy (2005). And see Elsworth-Jones (2012, pp. 97–98) on reasons for his anonymity.
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made about those who wore V-masks at Occupy Movement sites during the popular
‘Occupy’ protests of 2011. (Masks with the face of a Guy Fawkes-type character,
which were referred to by one journalist as a ‘symbol of festive citizenship’.)20
Identity concealment was bound up with the carnivalesque component of the
protest, with a sense of losing oneself and with a rejection of charismatic leadership
that was symbolized by protestors presenting themselves as part of the anonymous
mass or ‘the 99%’.21 Similarly, there is a long-standing, but somewhat rare, practice
of identity concealment that we might call ‘Jane Doe refusal’. This involves a
refusal to disclose identity following arrest in order to continue to disrupt the legal
process, even at the expense of being incarcerated rather than bailed. Instances of
Jane Doe refusal can be found in accounts of both the anti-abortion movement of the
1980s and the anti-capitalist movement of the early 2000s.22
Against the idea that covertness is intrinsically suspect there is a case for saying
that whether or not acting in a covert manner is sinister, suspect or both, depends at
least in part upon the reasons for the covertness, its impact upon others and the
lengths to which agents will go in order to preserve it. Thought of in these terms,
there need be nothing intrinsically suspect about the reasons for covertness by
animal rescuers of either sort. A degree of covertness by both open and covert
rescuers at the point of rescue may readily be explained by appeal to a desire to
avoid any violent physical confrontation with security personnel. The continuing
refusal of more strictly covert ALF rescuers to disclose their identities after a rescue
may also be explained, at least in part, by a desire to minimize the (all-too genuine)
risks of animal recovery. Neither of these motives seem at all sinister, and both are
at least consistent with a refusal to protect anonymity by violence or by threats
rather than guile. However, a reformulation of the objection might be run by
drawing from the idea of an avoidance of face-to-face confrontation (violent or
otherwise). Perhaps there is something ethically privileged in the facial encounter.
This is a familiar idea which appears in a figurative form in the writings of
Emannuel Levinas but which can be found in a more literal and literary form in Iris
Murdoch and indeed Herman Melville. Within radical political theory, it occurs as a
reason for favouring the classic New England Town Hall Meeting over the
anonymity of referenda.23 But a good deal of what seems to be non-controversially
civil disobedience (including open rescue) does not involve confrontation of this
face-to-face sort. A civilly disobedient crowd can be, in a sense, faceless i.e. an
anonymous mass. Added to which, police personnel can also have their faces
concealed behind masks, a move that may rule out any direct, two-way facial
encounter. If such an encounter, or even something rather more one-sided, were
20 Jones (2011).
21 Van Gelder (2011, vii, p. 1).
22 For Jane Doe refusal by anti-abortionists, see Nathanson (1989, pp. 31–32); for Jane Doe refusal by
anti-capitalists, see Thompson (2010, pp. 59–60).
23 Levinas (1985), pp. 95–98. Murdoch (1957) centres its narrative around the facial encounter. Bryan
(2004, p. 16) favours the town hall meeting over referenda because of the latter’s lack of face-to-face
engagement. For the latter, see also Milligan (2016, pp. 100-101).
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required for civil disobedience then we are likely to exclude a great deal of entirely
open and peaceful activity.
(2) Reason-2 It may be suggested that civil disobedients are protestors who
accept the consequences of their actions and this requires that they must act
publicly and must disclose their identities.24
In the case of covert rescue it may be charged that identity concealment is not
motivated solely by reflection upon the interests of the rescued animals but by a
refusal to stand up and be counted. However, this line of criticism is problematic.
Covert rescue no doubt involves all sorts of people engaging on a once-only basis,
but it depends upon a cadre of experienced activists who are well aware that sooner
or later they are liable to be arrested. Keith Mann’s insider account of the ALF,
From Dusk ‘til Dawn (2009) is a testament to this fact. It is, in part, a history of
arrests and imprisonments, largely written while Mann was in jail.25 Ingrid
Newkirk’s somewhat earlier narrative account of the making of an ALF activist,
Free the Animals (1992, revised in 2000), although a little dated and dramatized,
contains an account of an introductory skills camp where lower-level activists are
warned about the strong likelihood of both arrest and imprisonment: ‘‘We’re not
building flash-in-the-pan heroes here,’’ M continued, ‘‘but a long-term army of
committed people who accept that they may end up in the clink. Don’t think for one
moment that you’re too smart to be caught.’’26 Even with the (problematic) appeal
to the military imagery of army-building (an appeal which, curiously, does match up
with recurring Gandhian imagery of a war for justice) given recognition of this sort,
that arrest is more a matter of when rather than if, it is not at all obvious that overt
and covert rescue really do differ in term of the readiness of activists to accept arrest
as the price of their dissent. It is perhaps more accurate to say that open rescue has
an association with regarding arrest as itself a useful political act. At least
sometimes, open rescue can involve an invitation to arrest, an offering of oneself as
a sacrifice. But it is not obvious that civil disobedients must act in such a way. It
may better capture the outlook and practice of the leaders of civil disobedience
movements (such as King and Gandhi) rather than the approach of ordinary
participants who are more or less prepared for arrest but who do not character-
istically invite it.
(3) Reason-3 Civil disobedience is primarily a form of address, a form of
communication which is, by its nature, a public act.
What this leaves us with is precisely what we may draw from Rawls, i.e. a theory
of communicative political practice—what I have referred to elsewhere as the
24 Foreman (1991, pp. 130–131) uses this as a way to distinguish between low-level eco-sabotage, i.e.
‘monkeywrenching’ and civil disobedience in the tradition of Gandhi, the Civil Rights Movement and the
peace movement. According to Foreman, only civil disobedience requires that credit be taken for the
action while monkeywrenching is simply more effective if practised covertly.
25 Mann (2009, pp. 16–19).
26 Newkirk (2000, p. 50).
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‘communication thesis’.27 On such a view, civil disobedience is a way of saying
something and, where the cause is just, it may be warranted when other,
legally sanctioned and less disruptive, opportunities for communicating effectively
and in a timely manner, have been cut off.28 However, as a cautionary note about
endorsing the communication thesis too readily, it may be pointed out that its
provenance is somewhat ad hoc, and its justification is open to question.
With regard to provenance, the thesis goes back to both Rawls and, with
qualification, to Carl Cohen, but there is no explicit requirement for communication
in the single most influential academic account of civil disobedience to have been
set down prior to Cohen and Rawls, i.e. the Civil Rights Movement account
advanced by Hugo Bedau in the early 1960s and referred to above. Nor is it
consistently present in the writings of Thoreau, Tolstoy, Gandhi or King, although
there are intermittent hints at something of this sort. The reason for this is simple.
Cohen and Rawls encountered a movement that had to rely upon indirect means of
protest because what it was protesting about (the Vietnam War) took place
elsewhere. Justifying indirect action, such as the disruption of traffic, as something
other than juvenile and irrelevant to the issue in question, required appeal to the
communicative role of such protest. However, this always meant that the driver for
this conception of civil disobedience was the modelling of indirect rather than direct
forms of dissent whose communicative standing has always been at least
ambiguous.
What there is, by way of earlier precedent for the resulting conception of civil
disobedience, is a commitment on the part of Thoreau to regard civil disobedience
as conscientious action, a commitment on the part of Tolstoy to regard it as a
conscientious act of love, and an extension of this view by Gandhi and King that
turns civil disobedience into a loving appeal to the conscience of the political
opponent. It is, however, a problematic extension because it does not obviously
match up particularly well with the actual practice of either the US Civil Rights
Movement or the movement for Indian independence. Nonetheless, the idea of a
loving appeal provides us with a view of civil disobedience that arguably
presupposes communication of a sort, even if it does not explicitly call upon the
latter. However, it also (again, worryingly) requires us to regard civil disobedience
as a special kind of spiritual practice rather than merely allowing us to do so in
particular cases. As such it is a rather awkward precedent for those who wish to
depart from Tolstoy, Gandhi and King by presenting a strictly secular theory of civil
disobedience (and this is precisely what advocates of the communication thesis,
from John Rawls through to Ju¨rgen Habermas have striven to do).29 However, if
some stronger precedent for a restrictive, communicative, understanding of civil
disobedience could be found, such a precedent alone still might not be enough to
27 For the communication thesis see Milligan (2013, pp. 18–21).
28 The temporal clause is included in order to allow for cases where a threatened harm will not be
forestalled by the available opportunities for discourse. A similar point is made about direct action, in the
environmental case, by Humphrey (2006).
29 Habermas (1985). For both Rawls and Habermas, while agents might appeal to religious principles in
order to justify civil disobedience, such claims must permit translation into the shared language of what
the latter refers to as ‘the public sphere’. For the significance of the latter in this context see Smith (2011).
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warrant our continuing to regard civil disobedience in this way. And to say this is to
acknowledge that there never has been a single, stable and unchanging concept of
civil disobedience, but rather a concept which has been modified over time. It
should, however, be noted that such modification is entirely in line with a Gandhian
attitude towards conceptual innovation. It is an important part of his understanding
of what political theory does.30 Some level of semantic drift/conceptual innovation
also helps to explain the problematic nature of matching up any necessary and
sufficient conditions account with historical exemplars.31
With regard to the justification of particular reworkings of the concept, on a
Rawlsian account it is the communicative standing of civil disobedience that allows
us to understand why it has to be non-violent. Violence cuts across communication
and so, insofar as the action is genuinely communicative it will also have to be non-
violent. However, this move involves a false generalization and is, in any case
redundant. It involves a false generalization because violence can be communica-
tive, and communicative in more than the loose sense in which all actions may be
said to communicate something. Violence often sends a message. (I say this only as
a point about violence and not at all as a justification of it.) The move is,
additionally, redundant because the centrality of non-violence to our understanding
of civil disobedience does not need to be underpinned by appeal to something which
is far more open to dispute.32 In some respects, it actually obscures the centrality of
non-violence by making it seem like a derivative feature.
Challenging the Communication Thesis
In the light of this third reason for requiring that civil disobedience must be public,
those who wish to defend the possibility that covert rescue could be civil
disobedience (even though it often, perhaps even always, fails to qualify) have two
options: firstly, an argument may be made that some instances of covert rescue
could be sufficiently communicative to qualify; and secondly, the communication
thesis may itself be challenged. Both options have something going for them. It can,
for example, be argued that covert rescue genuinely is communicative, albeit only
up to a point. In the case of the rescue of lab animals, it does (deliberately) send a
message to practitioners of experimentation that their actions are deemed
indefensible by the rescuing agents (or whichever constituency they believe
themselves to represent). And when it is accompanied by subsequent publicity it
30 Milligan (2014, p. 288) summarizes the attitude towards conceptual modification in Gandhi’s
commentary on the Baghavad Gita.
31 The line between conceptual change and the development of a concept may be hard to draw. But all
that I am seeking to presuppose by speaking of the latter rather than the former is an element of strong
continuity between successive construals of ‘civil disobedience’.
32 This is not, however, to endorse an absolute exclusion of everything that might be construed as
violence. Gandhi, in his commentary upon the Gita claims that breathing and thinking involve violence.
When his political writings uphold non-violence it is not absolute non-violence that he has in mind
(Gandhi 2011, p. 266, p. 309). Carl Cohen was, again, more cautious than Rawls about this matter and
suggested that it was ‘arbitrary’ to entirely rule out violence of every sort in every context (Cohen 1971,
pp. 22–36).
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sends a message to the experimentation establishment as a whole that their most
publicity-sensitive practices may be exposed to public view. Given this, what may
be required for a comprehensive exclusion of civil disobedience claims is some
stronger version of the communication thesis such that civil disobedience is not just
action with a communicative dimension but is essentially or primarily commu-
nicative action. One way to make this shift would be to say that the primary
intention of the agents involved has to be the communication of a message. This
would, admittedly, count against a good deal of covert rescue. While rescues are
sometimes filmed, it would be odd for a rescue, in full flow, to be called off because
a camera had ceased to function.
No doubt it is hard to disentangle the multiple intentions of agents. There is
ambiguity and indeterminacy in what any of us may be trying to accomplish at any
given point in time. Even so, there does seem to be at least some sense in which the
immediate and primary aim of covert rescue tends to be the rescue of the animals
themselves. However, even in the face of such a strongly formulated version of the
communication thesis it may still be pointed out that at least some rescues, and
particularly some of the earliest ALF actions if not later actions, may well have been
carried out with something close to a primarily communicative intent, as a signal
that the ALF was alive and thriving. In spite of covertness, such rescues would still
seem to qualify as communicative acts and hence would still be candidates for civil
disobedience in spite of their covert dimensions. To absolutely guarantee their
exclusion, recourse might have to be made to a simpliciter insistence upon public-
ness on its own or in conjunction with an appeal to communication; or else there
might be a return to the anthropocentric exclusion of all actions other than those
which concern basic issues of inter-human justice; or, alternatively, an even more
stringent and perhaps less attractive version of the communication thesis may be
required. None of these look like particularly promising options.
If the communication thesis is construed in a sufficiently open manner it may be
unobjectionable but will not exclude covert rescue. If it is construed strictly, the
second option, of challenging the thesis, may then be the best response. As part of a
softening-up exercise prior to its rejection, it may be pointed out that, like the
anthropocentric restriction of civil disobedience to actions that defend human
liberties, it may simply exclude too much. Public actions that do not involve any
form of identity concealment, but which are ways of frustrating, obstructing or
preventing, will also be ruled out, unless they too are regarded as, simultaneously,
ways of communicating (on a strong account, primarily forms of communication).
Eco-actions such as the blockading of roads, the occupation of endangered
woodland sites and instances of ‘locking-on’ by activists who chain themselves
in situ in order to cause non-violent inconvenience, will all fail to qualify. We may,
of course, attempt to play up their communicative dimension, but this could distort
our understanding of activist intent. Nonetheless, these do look suspiciously like
precisely the sorts of actions that we would ordinarily regard as civil disobedience
unless we happen to regard the latter concept as out of date.
What is, perhaps, curious here is that while many other features of the Rawlsian
account have steadily been chipped away over time, the communication thesis has
continued to be accepted with relatively few dissenting voices. The most notable of
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the latter has come from Jennifer Welchman.33 In the light of the rise of the ecology
and animal rights movements, and against the backdrop of anti-capitalist protests
over debt and world trade, Welchman mounted a brief but frequently cited attack
which was based around three claims: (a) the communication thesis was little more
than an ad hoc response to vocal opponents of civil disobedience, a way of placating
hostile critics rather than generalizing upon the experience of protesters; (b) it
excludes, for no sufficiently good reason, at least one previously accepted paradigm
instance of civil disobedience: the Underground Railroad in the antebellum South;
and (c) it requires an arbitrary prioritization of indirect protest (which is essentially
communicative) over instances of direct action.
As a rider, Welchman conceded a level of consistency to Rawls that was absent
from Cohen. While Rawls was comparatively open about the normative and
revisionary nature of his account (i.e. its status as an account of what we ought to
think of as civil disobedience), Cohen was far more cautious. He recognized, from
the outset, and was uncomfortable with the fact that the communication thesis did
create problems for the long-standing classification of slave rescue by Underground
Railroad activists as civil disobedience. (Biographies of Harriet Tubman still use
this classification as a way of drawing a connection between her activities and the
Civil Rights Movement.)34 Unwilling to entirely abandon this paradigm case, Cohen
retained it as a marginal instance, thereby ruling out the stricter account of the
communication thesis towards which Rawls inclined. But if this move were to be
endorsed, it would be all but impossible to exclude every possible instance of covert
animal rescue unless the (normally rejected) anthropocentric restriction is
reinstated.35 If the Underground Railroad was a marginal case of civil disobedience
then some non-violent and suitably structured instances of covert animal rescue may
also be instances of civil disobedience.
More generally, while the Rawls/Cohen appeal to communication was, as
Welchman accepted, a good way to make sense of indirect civil disobedience, it was
and is far from obvious that our understanding of civil disobedience as a whole
ought to be modelled upon the latter. Why not, for example, embrace a disjunctive
account such that civil disobedience can be either a certain kind of communication
or a certain kind of direct action in which communication plays (at most) a
subordinate role? Such an account might at least have the merit of a good fit with all
of the paradigm historical instances that are partly constitutive of our understanding
of the concept. While CND and the Vietnam protests involved indirect action, the
Civil Rights Movement primarily involved what King openly referred to as direct
action (not lovingly addressed to the conscience of the opponent but aimed instead
at embarrassing the Federal Government into enforcing its laws). Finally, the Indian
independence movement involved both indirect protest (e.g. non-cooperation with
the state educational system) as well as direct action (e.g. the violation of the
33 Welchman (2001).
34 Clinton (2005, p. 56).
35 The relevance of this example to the covert rescue of animals, need not be made contingent upon the
quite different claim, associated with the ‘liberationist’ tradition of animal rights, that the standing of
animals today is strongly analogous to that of slaves. For the latter, compare Francione (2008, pp. 46–53)
with Tuan (1984) which stresses the more ambivalent position of animals as property.
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restriction upon private individuals producing and selling salt). A disjunctive
approach to the concept looks promising.
Its attractiveness may lead us to wonder why the communication thesis, modelled
as it was upon indirect dissent, ever became quite so embedded. But here we may
reflect not only upon a narrative about the moment at which Rawls and Cohen were
writing, but also upon the deliberative turn in political theory which was already
gaining momentum in the 1970s. If democracy was not just about procedures, but
about effective and informed communication, then why not regard civil disobedi-
ence in much the same light? However, as it fits so well with such a
respectable trend in political theory we may then wonder whether the price of
sticking with the communication thesis in spite of its problematic features is
particularly high? After all, every theory will have its problems. I will suggest that
the price is too high because the retention of the thesis risks turning civil
disobedience into an endangered concept. More specifically, it leaves civil
disobedience vulnerable to what we may call the ‘argument from below’, i.e. the
argument that civil disobedience is overly deferential to authority and aims to
persuade political elites who stand in need of coercion rather than persuasion, and
therefore activists ought to be in the direct action business rather than the civil
disobedience business. Variant formulations of this argument have gained
widespread currency among a variety of political activists, such as environmental
activists (Dave Forman advanced it during his Earth First! days); animal rights
activists (Paul Watson of the Sea Shepherds has appealed to version of it); and the
activists involved in the Occupy Movement of 2011.36
One of the reasons why such an abandonment (or at least partial abandonment) of
the concept is problematic is that no other concept carries the moral authority of
‘civil disobedience’, and none is likely to do so for the foreseeable future. We may
speak of ‘direct action’ (as Martin Luther King and the anarchist tradition both do)
or of ‘radical disobedience’ (and similar concepts that have emerged among eco-
activists). However, none of these concepts is so deeply embedded in traditions of
dissent in which the manner of the protest is, from an ethical standpoint, exemplary
in ways that call for special consideration. And this, rather than an attitude towards
animal activism alone, is the driving consideration behind the present paper: the
concept of civil disobedience is, at present, irreplaceable yet the ways in which the
theory of civil disobedience has been shaped by presumptions about communication
and overtness, drive it apart from actual instances of non-violent dissent whose
goals may be varied and often concerned with the prevention rather than the
publicizing of harms. What is then in danger of being lost is the ongoing relevance
of a concept of protest that still has a great deal of work left to do.
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36 For reticence about advancing a claim of civil disobedience in relation to the Occupy Movement, see
Harcourt (2011). For Paul Watson advancing the argument from below see Milligan (2013, pp. 27–28).
For Dave Foreman advancing this position, see Foreman (1991, pp. 130–131).
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